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LETTER DATED 16 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 16 October 1998 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. In the letter, the Minister gives examples of the practices on the part of the inspection teams of the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency that serve as a cover for activities of an intelligence-related character carried out on behalf of parties hostile to Iraq. He requests you to take deterrent measures in order to put a definitive end to such practices.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 16 October 1998 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

On many occasions, and most recently in my letter dated 30 September 1998 addressed to you (S/1998/906, annex), I have drawn your attention to practices on the part of individuals working for the Special Commission that are prejudicial to Iraq's security and sovereignty. We have expressed serious concern with regard to these practices, and we have called attention to the fact that they make use of Security Council resolutions as a cover for engaging in actions of a manifestly intelligence-related character that bear no relation to the objectives of those resolutions or to the work of the Special Commission thereunder. This has been confirmed by the recent disclosure, in The Washington Post for 29 September 1998, of information that the former inspector Scott Ritter and other individuals working for the Special Commission have had links with the intelligence agencies of countries that have their own hostile objectives against Iraq. There was also, of course, the previously disclosed connection of David Kaye, the former American inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the United States Central Intelligence Agency. I remind you that we also called attention at an early stage to the unprofessional actions of Scott Ritter, which were not congruent with the conduct expected of an international civil servant working under the flag of the United Nations.

The established facts, as supported by the evidence concerning these numerous egregious practices, indicate that there is an essential flaw in the Special Commission's mode of functioning and in its composition, and they threaten the very credibility and integrity of the United Nations. This reinforces the importance of our request that an official inquiry should be instituted into the actions, conduct and linkages of the Special Commission and that appropriate measures should be taken to correct them so as to safeguard the trustworthiness and impartiality of the United Nations.

These egregious practices include the demand for updated sensitive information concerning individuals or vital activities or concerning strategic installations that are closely linked with the security and the future of the people of Iraq and that bear no relation to the tasks set forth in section C of resolution 687 (1991).

I should like to provide you hereunder with some examples of such egregious practices reported over the past three months.

1. On 30 August 1998, the leader of the Chemical Group asked for the following information concerning personnel of the State Crop Protection Board who had doctoral degrees or were doctors of veterinary medicine (see appendix I): position; degree/subject; country and university or college from which degree was obtained; and date degree was obtained. Despite our pointing out to the chief inspector that, under annex II to the monitoring plan pursuant to resolution 715 (1991) and the protocols established in 1994 for sites subject to monitoring, only the total number of those working at the site and the number of

those with higher degrees were required to be provided, he nevertheless insisted on seeking the information in question. One week later, he requested the same information concerning persons with advanced degrees at the Construction Research Centre of the Ministry of Industry. When a representative of the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) objected, the chief inspector said that the information was being requested on instructions from New York.

2. On 18 July 1998, a group from the UNSCOM 242 inspection team was engaged in diving operations in the area of the arm of the Tigris River when a train carrying military equipment passed by. The American inspector Jason Gilbert, who was supervising the diving operations, surreptitiously took photographs of the train from behind a large vehicle belonging to the Special Commission. He was seen doing this by the Iraqi escorts and was asked to destroy the film. He complied with the request and destroyed the film. At the time, we requested your Special Envoy, Mr. Prakash Shah, to investigate this incident on the grounds that such an action was obviously intelligence-related.

3. In the course of a visit by the MG-19 missile group to the Karamah Establishment on 8 October 1998, Mr. Carl Pfluger, a United States national, using his own personal camera, took a series of photographs of the warhead of a Sumud missile that was being prepared for a flight test. When a representative of the NMD, with the approval of the chief inspector, sought to take and destroy the film, Mr. Pfluger admitted that the camera was his personal property. He declined to destroy the film, indicating that it also contained some personal photographs. The NMD escort offered to take custody of the film until such time as the NMD could be briefed concerning the incident. Mr. Pfluger refused this offer. Mr. Pfluger then pretended to remove the film from the camera, which was concealed in his bag, in order to destroy it. It transpired that the film he handed over for destruction was a new one, and when the Iraqi escort examined the camera he found that the original film was still inside. Only then did Mr. Pfluger extract the film and destroy it.

4. One last shameful example of these intelligence-related practices will suffice. In June 1998, an IAEA environmental nuclear monitoring team led by an American, Jay Hyland, and consisting of three American inspectors, acting on the pretext of establishing environmental databases for the ongoing nuclear monitoring regime, sought information on every detail of Iraq's water resources, including:

(a) Discharge- and level-gauging stations;

(b) River cross-sections;

(c) River sediment and method of measurement and analysis;

(d) Dams and reservoirs and their location, the date on which they began operation, their design specifications, and their level and discharge in daily operation;

(e) Watersheds and plant cover.

The Iraqi side discussed these requests in good faith in order to determine the extent to which such information was needed. The members of the inspection team stated that they needed to formulate a mathematical model of the river system in Iraq and of the movement of sediment and that the hydrological information requested by them was for the purpose of operating this model. The specialists at the Iraqi Ministry of Irrigation evinced their lack of conviction that the model in question would advance the objective of the ongoing monitoring regime. They stated that that objective could be achieved by gauging heavy elements in the water associated with nuclear activities and that there was no need for information so detailed as to include an inventory of the country's water resources, their modes of operation and their uses.

In September 1998 another team, this one led by Jacques Baute, a French national, and consisting of two American inspectors, Ned Wogman and David Swindle, requested the same information. Examination of the mathematical model showed that it was one for river-water flow and that, in view of its range and comprehensiveness, it would require information to be gathered on all the water resources in Iraq.

The objective of the monitoring regime is that Iraq should not engage in prohibited nuclear activities. This can be achieved by taking samples of water and sediment, and there is no justification for obtaining every piece of information concerning water resources and their uses in Iraq. It is our conviction that any insistence on seeking this information is nothing but espionage on strategic water resources in Iraq. This is information of a sensitive political character.

I am transmitting with this letter a description of the mathematical model in question and of the information requested in its regard (see appendix II), which will leave no room for doubt that this is an intelligence-related information gathering operation targeting water resources in Iraq.

We believe that these are not individual, isolated incidents but are closely linked with the relations of the Special Commission and of some IAEA elements with parties hostile to Iraq. They are also linked with the unique working methods of the Special Commission, which are not in keeping with the conduct expected of a body operating under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition to an official inquiry, I also request you to take the necessary measures against those individuals working for the Special Commission who play roles such as those depicted and who engage in practices that jeopardize the security and sovereignty of Iraq.

The persistence of these egregious practices and failure to take deterrent measures to put a definitive end to them will force Iraq to take the appropriate steps to protect its security and sovereignty.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister

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Employees With Academic Education

Name	Position	Degree/ Subject	Obtained from (Univ., College etc.)	Date obtained

Plant / Facility:

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Appendix II

Working Draft

Modeling Approach

The river system will be represented by a number of subbasins and associated channel reaches. Runoff and sediment from each subbasin are input to the associated reach of channel. The river model is used to route the water, sediment, and any nuclides through the channel system based on simulated hydraulic conditions under the prescribed boundary and input conditions. Output from the model is planned to include a time series of nuclide concentrations at selected channel locations. The availability of the following data are required to be determined for this modeling approach:

River Discharge

- Location
- Period of record
- Reported frequency (mean daily or hourly, preferred).
- Cross-sectional geometry (for river model hydraulic calculations)
- Rating curve (stage-discharge) with elevations
- Data storage characteristics (paper or electronic)

Current data will be used as input to river model links. Current/historic data can be used to define runoff relations (discharge/unit area) for application to ungauged basins.

Sediment

- Location
- Period of record
- Date/time and discharge when sampling
- Method of measurement
- Data storage characteristics

Current data will be used for sediment input to river model links. Current and historic data can be used to estimate watershed sediment yields.

Dams and Reservoirs

- Location
- Start of operations
- Min-normal-max pool elevations
- Maximum outflow

Data will be used to model flow regulation by the project.

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Watershed Data

- Land cover/land use
- Distribution of soil types

Data will be used to refine watershed runoff and sediment yield calculations.

River-Reservoir System

Schematic of Iraq River-Reservoir System and Gaging Stations



MASS1 1-D Transport Model

- Unsteady Flow in Rivers, Canals, and Reservoirs
- Tributary Inflows
- Variable Channel Shape
- Time-Varying Radionuclide Releases

Model Application



Hydrologic Data Requirements

- River Gauging Station (beginning with 1987)
- Reservoirs (beginning with 1987)
- Sediment Characteristics (all available)

Gauging Stations: Locations

Tigris River	Euphrates River
Mosul (9)	Hsaba (Syria / Iraq Border) (10)
D/S Dibbis Dam (3)	Hit (11)
Sammara Barrage (4)	Rammadi Barrage (12)
Adahim at Narrows (5)	Falluja Barrage (13)
Baghdad (6)	Hindiya Barrage (14)
Dyala Weir (7)	
Kut Barrage (8)	

Gauging Stations: Hydraulic Properties

- Location in latitude-longitude
- Daily Water Surface Elevation (m)
- Daily Discharge (m^3/s)
- Channel Cross-Sectional Bed Elevations (m)
- Station Rating Curve(s) (relation between water elevation and discharge)

Reservoirs: Locations

Tigris River	Euphrates River
Saddam	Qadisya
Dokan	Habbaniya
Tharthar	Razzaza
Derbendi Khan	
Hemren	
Huaiza	

Reservoirs: Hydraulic Properties

- Daily Outflow Discharge (m^3/s)
- Daily Pool Elevations (m)
- Minimum-Normal-Maximum Pool Elevations (m)
- Water Surface Elevation-Storage-Surface Area Relation
- Maximum Capacity for Spillway and Power House (m^3/s)
- Channel Bottom Elevation (m)

Sediment Data

- Sample Location in Latitude-Longitude
- Time/Date and River Discharge when Sampling
- Suspended Load (kg/s)
- Grain Size Distribution
- Organic Content